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One Child, Two Systems: State Statutory 




The desire to protect and provide for our children is fundamental to 
our society, embedded in both our state and federal systems of law. Both 
systems of law have their own mechanisms by which they reach this end; 
however, when federal immigration protections are married to existing 
state dependency systems there are bound to be some complications. One 
unintended consequence is the current circuit split among the Florida 
District Courts of Appeal relating to one of the seven Florida dependency 
provisions.1 At issue is the definition of a dependent child under section 
39.01(15)(e), Florida Statutes, which includes a child the court finds “[t]o 
have no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and 
care.”2 
The Florida District Courts of Appeals (“DCAs”) have disagreed on 
the application of section (15)(e) in cases where the child has an adult 
providing for him or her, but the adult is not a parent or legal custodian. 
Certain Florida courts have expanded section 39.01(15)(e) of the Florida 
Statutes 3  to include caregivers, while others have stuck to its literal 
language.4 This Note will explore: which interpretation of section (15)(e) 
is best supported by textual interpretation and legislative intent, the various 
legally recognized relationships between adults and children, and how this 
circuit split is intertwined with concerns regarding private dependency 
petitions filed by immigrant juveniles. The problems created by merging 
federal immigration law with Florida’s existing state dependency system 
                                                                                                                  
* J.D., 2018, Florida State University School of Law; B.S., 2015, Florida State University.  
1O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 205 So. 3d 575, 576 (Fla. 2016). 
2FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15) (2017). 
3§ 39.01(15)(e). 
4See L.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 48 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); see also In 
re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 578-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). 
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are legitimate but can be assuaged in a number of ways by the courts, 
legislature, and even individual attorneys. 
 
II. Survey of Florida Cases 
 
Section 39.01(15)(e) is one of Florida’s seven independent 
dependency provisions, defining a dependent child as one who has “no 
parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and care.”5 As 
stated above, the Florida District Courts of Appeal have disagreed in how 
to apply section (15)(e) of the Florida Statutes in cases where the child has 
an adult providing for him or her, but that adult is not a parent or legal 
custodian. 
Previous courts have found children dependent because parents were 
simply not available—thus unable to provide supervision or care. For 
example, this sometimes happens if parents are incarcerated.6 Some recent 
Florida cases have found that being cared for by an adult “caregiver” will 
preclude a finding of dependency, assuming the current caregiver is 
adequate.7 In so reasoning, courts have focused on the “caregiver” term, 
defined as any “other person responsible for a child’s welfare” under 
section 39.01(47) of the Florida Statutes.8 This “caregiver” term does not 
appear in the statutory language of section 39.01(15)(e). 
For example, the Third DCA recently reasoned that a godmother 
(who was not a legal guardian) qualified as an “other person responsible 
for a child’s welfare” under section 39.01(47) of the Florida Statutes, thus 
preventing an adjudication of dependency under section (15)(e). 9 
Similarly, in O.I.C.L v. Department of Children & Families, a child was 
being cared for by an uncle (who was not a legal guardian), and the Fourth 
DCA affirmed that the uncle’s care also prevented adjudication of 
                                                                                                                  
5§ 39.01(15)(e). 
6In re T.S.M., 564 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (child was dependent due to having 
both parents in state prison); see also G.S. v. T.B., 969 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) 
(finding children were dependent due to being orphaned). 
7In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), decision quashed sub 
nom. B.R.C.M. v. Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S472 (Fla. 
Apr. 20, 2017); see also O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244, 1248 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015); In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (although 
section 39.01(15)(e) was not raised in the petition, the court considered the fact that he 
was being voluntarily and adequately taken care of, and brought up the section 39.01(47) 
definition of caregiver). 
8See cases cited supra note 7. 
9B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d at 752-54. 
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dependency.10 The court stated the uncle, who was not a legal guardian, 
was capable of “capable of providing [both] supervision and care,” 
repurposing the wording of section 39.01(15)(e).11 
It should be noted, however, that the contours of this “circuit split” 
are muddled. Even the Fourth DCA agreed that a child was dependent 
under (15)(e) where the child lived with his girlfriend’s parents who had 
no legal obligation to support him, and evidence was presented that the 
child’s parents were deceased.12 Additionally, in 2011 Judge Salter of the 
Third DCA wrote a majority opinion expressing that “T.J.’s aunt is not a 
‘parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care’ under 
section 39.01(15)(e). . . . T.J. has made a prima facie case that she is 
dependent.”13 
The First and Fifth DCAs, meanwhile, have stuck to the literal 
language of the provision. The Fifth DCA, following the statutory 
language nearly word for word, has stated that “a child is dependent if the 
child is an orphan and has no legal custodian. . . . [The child] was an 
orphan with no legal custodian and, therefore, he was dependent.”14 Along 
the same lines, the First DCA found that even if a responsible adult is 
available it does not prevent adjudication under section (15)(e).  Due to 
the “lack of a legally compelled relationship between the children and their 
caretakers, they [are] not adequately protected from the harms Chapter 39 
of the Florida Statutes is designed to prevent and remedy.”15 
 
III. Florida’s Legislative Intent 
A. PLAIN MEANING AND INTERPRETIVE CANONS 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the starting point for 
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”16 The legislature 
explicitly sets out only two categories of caregivers in (15)(e): parents and 
legal custodians.17 Starting with parents, the legislature defines a parent as 
follows: 
‘Parent’ means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man 
whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under 
                                                                                                                  
10O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1248. 
11 Id. 
12F.L.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 
13In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). 
14L.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 48 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). 
15In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 578-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). 
16CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
17FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(e) (2017). 
 
30 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:27 
s. 63.062(1). The term ‘parent’ also means legal father as defined 
in this section. If a child has been legally adopted, the term ‘parent’ 
means the adoptive mother or father of the child. For purposes of 
this chapter only, when the phrase ‘parent or legal custodian’ is 
used, it refers to rights or responsibilities of the parent and, only if 
there is no living parent with intact parental rights, to the rights or 
responsibilities of the legal custodian who has assumed the role of 
the parent.18 
In regard to “legal custodians” or “legal guardians,” as defined in 
section 39.01(34), Florida Statutes, the term “legal custody” means: 
[A] legal status created by a court which vests in a custodian of the 
person or guardian, whether an agency or an individual, the right 
to have physical custody of the child and the right and duty to 
protect, nurture, guide, and discipline the child and to provide him 
or her with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical, dental, 
psychiatric, and psychological care.19 
A legal “permanent guardianship” means “a judicially created relationship 
between the child and caregiver which is intended to be permanent and 
self-sustaining and is provided pursuant to the procedures in chapter 
744.”20 
By comparison, section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes broadly defines 
the term “caregiver” as “the parent, legal custodian, permanent guardian, 
adult household member, or other person responsible for a child’s welfare 
as defined in subsection (47).”21 Subsection 47 goes on to define “other 
person responsible for a child’s welfare” to include: 
[T]he child’s legal guardian or foster parent; an employee of any 
school, public or private child day care center, residential home, 
institution, facility, or agency; a law enforcement officer employed 
in any facility, service, or program for children that is operated or 
contracted by the Department of Juvenile Justice; or any other 
person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential 
setting; and includes an adult sitter or relative entrusted with a 
child’s care.22 
Considering the care, the legislature has taken to explicitly define 
“legal custody,” “guardian,” and “caregiver” outside of the list of 
dependency grounds, the terms “parent” or “legal custodian” in (15)(e) 
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alone are probably not ambiguous enough to warrant broader 
interpretation. Additionally, the legislature has taken care to elaborate on 
the joint phrase “parent or legal custodian” within the definition of 
“parent” which informs the court that consideration of a child’s legal 
custodian should be secondary to that of a parent.23 This provision does 
not elucidate whether the term “caregiver” fits into this phrase. 
Ultimately, if lacking in ambiguity, the plain meaning of the text 
controls. The strict interpretation favored by the First and Fifth DCAs 
follows one of the most basic, interpretive canons, expressio unius—when 
a statute designates certain things, all omissions should be understood as 
exclusions.24 Simply put, had the legislature intended to include the term 
“caregivers,” it would have done so. This rule, however, should be applied 
within reason, and courts reject the application of the doctrine almost as 
often as it is used.25 In determining if expressio unis should apply, “courts 
may consider whether there is reason to believe that the legislature 
considered and rejected alternatives,” i.e. whether the exclusion was 
purposeful.26 
Based on an overview of the statutory text alone, the legislature’s 
exclusion of the term “caregiver” is more likely to be intentional than it is 
to be legislative oversight, although the argument is not overly robust. It 
is normally assumed that the legislature intends to be consistent and 
coherent (The Whole Act Rule).27 Section (15)(a), the first dependency 
ground, lacks the term caregiver just like (15)(e), stating that a dependent 
child is one has “been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s 
parent[s] or legal custodians.”28 Section (15)(c) applies to situations where 
a child has already been sheltered, and “a case plan has expired and the 
                                                                                                                  
23§ 39.01(50) (“[W]hen the phrase ‘parent or legal custodian’ is used, it refers to rights or 
responsibilities of the parent and, only if there is no living parent with intact parental 
rights, to the rights or responsibilities of the legal custodian who has assumed the role of 
the parent.”). 
24Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank 
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”). 
25HILLEL Y. LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A PRACTICAL LAWYERING COURSE, 208 
(2014). 
26 Id. 
27General interpretative principle known as the “Whole Act Rule” according to which 
“each term of provision of a statute should be viewed as part of a consistent and 
integrated whole.” James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the 
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2005). In pari materia 
(“on the same subject”) cannon dictates that statutes should be read together. West Va. 
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parent or parents or legal custodians have failed to substantially comply 
with the requirements of the plan.” Section (15)(f) follows suit by defining 
a dependent child as one found “to be at substantial risk of imminent 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal 
custodians.” 
At first, this consistency in only singling out parents or legal 
custodians seems to strongly support the idea that the term caregiver does 
not belong in (15)(e), and thus expressio unius should apply. However, the 
last provision bucks the trend by defining a dependent child as one found 
“[t]o have been sexually exploited and to have no parent, legal custodian, 
or responsible adult relative currently known and capable of providing the 
necessary and appropriate supervision and care.” 29  Additionally, upon 
further inspection, the legislature has been less consistent with 
terminology in the rest of the chapter than it was within the list of seven 
dependency grounds. As stated above, the full definition of abandonment 
includes the term caregiver (“in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, 
the caregiver”).  Under the definition of “abuse,” harm to the child can be 
perpetrated by “any person” while neglect can be “perpetrated by an” other 
person responsible for the child’s welfare.” 
The lack of streamlined terminology severely weakens arguments on 
either side that the legislature was consistent in excluding or including the 
term caregiver in its dependency provisions. The legislature has used 
several different terms even in the same subsection of the act: “caregiver,” 
“responsible adult relative,” “other person responsible for the child’s 
welfare,” and “any person.” Although these terms may arguably have a 
common meaning or purpose for being in the statute, because the statute 
uses different terms, the usual presumption is that different terms mean 
different things. Otherwise, the legislature would have used the same term. 
This presumption is an offshoot of the rule against surplusage—if these 
terms were all read to have the same meaning, it would mean the 
legislature has used meaningless, surplus language.30  On the other hand, 
the fact that several of these broad, catchall category terms were included 
in some provisions lends itself to a tentative argument that the legislature 
considered, but chose not to, include any such similar term in (15)(e). 
As a related note, it is important to distinguish cases in which a 
juvenile presented a (15)(e) argument in his private dependency petition, 
and those in which he did not. For example, in S.H. v. Department of 
Children and Families, the petitioner raised a single dependency ground: 
abandonment.31 In this case, consideration of his caregiver—his uncle—
                                                                                                                  
29§ 39.01(15)(g) (emphasis added). 
30LEVIN, supra note 25, at 210. 
31880 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 
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was appropriate to preclude adjudication because the statutory definition 
of abandonment in section 39.01(1) contains parents, legal custodians, and 
caregivers. 
While there is no consistent usage, the legislature does frequently use 
the term caregiver or an equivalent term throughout Chapter 39 as a 
catchall.32 The most apparent benefit the Legislature receives from using 
the word “caregiver” throughout the Florida Statutes is the fact the term is 
vague. The word “caregiver” is a general, layman’s term that is often used 
as a placeholder, rather than having to repeatedly list parent, or legal 
guardian, or legal custodian, or permanent guardian, etc. For example, 
section 39.001(7) of Florida Statutes, which defines “parent, custodial, and 
guardian responsibilities,” uses “caregiver” interchangeably with these 
terms instead of repeating the triad.33 
There is an argument that the legislature’s larger purpose in using the 
term “caregiver” throughout the Florida Statutes is to widen the net of 
children who can be adjudicated dependent. The legislature expanded 
potential adjudications, for example, by inserting the term “caregiver” into 
section 39.201(1)(a), which mandates reporting of child abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect by any “parent, legal custodian, caregiver, or 
other person responsible for the child’s welfare . . . .”34 Those abandoned 
by their “caregiver” or neglected by another “person responsible for the 
child’s welfare” will still be adjudicated dependent. 35  Under these 
provisions, including the term “caregiver” (or similar term) consistently 
expands the net. The legislature’s intent may ostensibly be to prevent a 
child from falling through the cracks of a legal technicality. Section 
(15)(e), however, is unique because it has negative phrasing (“to have 
no”). Including the term “caregiver” (or similar term), while consistent 
with the other provisions, has just the opposite effect because it constricts 
the net. 
The circuit split, however, probably is best framed as a discussion of 
the absurd results doctrine, an equally established principal of statutory 
                                                                                                                  
32See § 39.01(1) (Abandonment) and § 39.201(1)(a) (Mandatory Reporting). 
33§ 39.001(7) (“Parents, custodians, and guardians are deemed by the state to be 
responsible for providing their children with sufficient support, guidance, and 
supervision. The state further recognizes that the ability of parents, custodians, and 
guardians to fulfill those responsibilities can be greatly impaired by economic, social, 
behavioral, emotional, and related problems. It is therefore the policy of the Legislature 
that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure that factors impeding the ability of caregivers 
to fulfill their responsibilities are identified through the dependency process and that 
appropriate recommendations and services to address those problems are considered in 
any judicial or nonjudicial proceeding.”) 
34§ 39.201(1)(a). 
35§§ 39.01(1), (30)(f). 
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interpretation.36 Thus, terms such as textualist or purposivist are not quite 
right to describe the opposing sides of this circuit split—if due regard is 
given to the statutory text first, “then everyone is a textualist.”37 The divide 
comes from whether one considers the strict application of the language 
sufficiently absurd. The Third and Fourth DCAs follow a different 
interpretation based on this reasoning. These courts assert that extending 
dependency resources to children who are being well-taken care of would 
contravene of the larger goals of the dependency system and its laws—and 
as such, the language cannot be applied straightforwardly. The Third DCA 
reasoned that “[a] godmother is neither a parent nor legal custodian under 
the statute. However, it is apodictic among the canons of judicial 
interpretation that judicial interpreters should consider the entire text of a 
statute, including its structure and the physical and logical relation of its 
many parts, when applying the language of the statute to a set of facts 
[referring to the whole-act or whole-text rule].”38 “We conclude, just as 
we did recently in In re K.B.L.V.: ‘The purpose of the dependency laws of 
this state is to protect and serve children and families in need, not those 
with a different agenda.’ “39 
The reasoning behind the absurdity doctrine is that a “statutory 
application which offends widely and deeply held social values must 
represent a failure of expression or foresight, which the legislators would 
surely have corrected had it come to their attention.”40 Some cases address 
statutory applications so absurd as to be accepted by both textualists and 
purposivists alike (e.g. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868)), 
whereas in others an absurdity to one person is merely a quirk to another. 
The doctrine is best used in cases of “true ambiguity. That is, where two 
different interpretations are plausible, the court will reject the 
interpretation that leads to absurd results.”41 In this regard, the Florida 
                                                                                                                  
36Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (“[T]he 
legislature used general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil. . .. It is 
the duty of the counts, under those circumstances, to say that, however broad the 
language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the 
intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.”); see, e.g., 
Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term–Foreword: The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1998). 
37Morell E. Mullins, Tools, Not Rules—The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 
30 J. LEGIS. 1, 21 (2003). 
38In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), decision quashed sub 
nom. B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S472 (Fla. Apr. 
20, 2017). 
39 Id. 
40JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 80 (2d 
ed. 2010). 
41Levin, supra note 25, at 219. 
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courts have not undergone a traditional absurdity doctrine analysis. It 
appears that the courts are making an assessment of what the legislature 
would have wanted to give the purposes and goals of Chapter 39, with an 
implicit absurdity doctrine rationale. 
The underlying rationale is that finding a child who has a caregiver 
to be dependent would be in conflict with Chapter 39’s purpose, and to 
openly contravene the purpose of Chapter 39 would offend a “deeply and 
widely held social value.” Going back to the text, the legislature’s express 
purpose of Chapter 39 is “[t]o provide for the care, safety, and protection 
of children in an environment that fosters healthy social, emotional, 
intellectual, and physical development; to ensure secure and safe custody; 
to promote the health and well-being of all children under the state’s care; 
and to prevent the occurrence of child abuse, neglect, and abandonment.”42 
This bland statement, however, hardly sheds light on the matter: whether 
Chapter 39’s purpose refers only to the care, safety, and protection of 
children who are “truly needy.”43 The Third and Fourth DCAs have better 
grounding in this argument than in the plain text, because the practice in 
any case of the last century involving statutory construction is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. 44  The plain meaning “can be 
overcome by compelling evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”45 As 
such, the question is whether the plain text should control or if there is 
compelling evidence of contrary legislative intent—leading into the next 
section’s discussion. 
B. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Courts often compare a statute to its predecessor statute. If the 
legislature reenacts the predecessor statute without changes, it is viewed 
as an affirmation of the previous language and its interpretations; if the 
legislature has made substantive changes, those changes can be a 
significant indicator of legislative intent. 46  While looking at statutory 
development is a textual tool of interpretation, it is useful to discuss it hand 
in hand with legislative history. Legislative history is often a useful source 
of information on the historical context and reasoning behind the 
legislature’s decision to change the language. 
                                                                                                                  
42FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a) (2017). 
43B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d at 752. 
44WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 232 (2d ed. 2006). 
45 Id. 
46Levin, supra note 25, at 215. 
 
36 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:27 
In this case, statutory development is significant in that the term 
“caregiver” was previously used in (15)(e), but removed. Prior to the major 
reorganization of chapter 39 in 1998, the forerunning provision stated that 
a dependent child was one found “[t]o have no parent, legal custodian, or 
responsible adult relative to provide supervision and care.”47 In 1998, 
during the rewrite of the chapter, the legislature struck the term 
“responsible adult relative” and replaced it with “caregiver.” 48   The 
following year, the legislature erased the term “caregiver” entirely from 
the provision. 49  The term “caregiver” was methodically removed and 
replaced with “legal custodian” in several other parts of the statute. The 
current language of (15)(e) was put in place and has not been changed 
since 1999. 
The committee reports from 1999 shed some light on why the term 
“caregiver” was removed. Conventionally, committee reports have been 
regarded as the most reliable form of legislative history50—or at least, the 
most accessible. In fact, very little history surrounding the legislature’s 
1999 enactment of (15)(e) is available other than two committee reports. 
The more detailed committee report, written by the Judiciary Committee, 
Committee on Children and Families, and Senator Mitchell, states that the 
1999 bill “makes technical and necessary changes to chapter 39, F.S., to 
correct errors and inconsistences resulting from last year’s major 
reorganization of the chapter during the 1998 session (ch. 98-403, L.O.F.). 
It clarifies the definitions, roles, obligations and rights of parents, legal 
custodians and caregivers depending on their involvement in proceedings 
under chapter 39, F.S.”51 Later on the committee states “[s]ubsequent to 
the rewrite of chapter 39, F.S., some errors and inconsistencies were 
uncovered [and] are being addressed to some extent in the proposed bill 
including clarifying the rights, responsibilities and legal obligations of 
parents, legal custodians and caregivers which vary according to their role 
and involvement in different proceedings under the chapter.”  
“Specifically, it attempts to clarify the usage of the terms ‘parent,’ [] ‘legal 
custodian,’ and ‘caregiver’ . . . [i]t also clarifies that when the term ‘parent 
or legal custodian’ is used in any provision that it refers to rights or 
                                                                                                                  
47FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11)(e) (1997) (emphasis added). 
48FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14)(e) (1998); Ch. 98-403, Laws of Fla. 
49FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14)(e) (1999); Ch. 99-193, Laws of Fla. 
50MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 40, at 136. 
51Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, Child. & Fams., Sen. Mitchell, SB 1666 (1999) Staff 
Analysis 1-2 (Apr. 15, 1999), available at 
https://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/1999/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB1666.ju.pdf. 
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responsibilities of the parent and only if there is no living parent, then the 
legal custodian stands in the stead of the parent.”52 
The committee report from the Committee on Children and Families 
specifically states “Section 1. Amends s. 39.001, F.S., 1998 Supp., to 
remove the terms ‘guardian’ and ‘caregiver’ and insert the term ‘legal 
custodian.’ The changes are technical and conforming.”53 Aside from the 
committee reports, there is no further discussion or explanation. No floor 
discussion was had addressing the choice of terminology, even when the 
amendment that methodically removed and replaced the term “caregiver” 
with “legal custodian” in several parts of the bill was presented on the 
floor.54 
That the term “caregiver” was in the provision at one point, but 
removed, strongly supports a plain text interpretation of the statute. Both 
committee reports reflect an understanding that the “rights, responsibilities 
and legal obligations” of “parents, legal custodians and caregivers . . . 
vary.” 55  The April committee analysis is “smoking gun” evidence of 
legislative intent, explicitly stating that one goal of the 1999 legislation 
was to clarify the terms “parent,” “legal custodian,” and “caregiver” in the 
aftermath of the previous year’s statutory reorganization. The legislative 
history and the genuine variations in legal rights and responsibilities 
strongly support an intentional restriction of (15)(e) to parents and legal 
custodians. 
C. THE MEANING OF PARENT, CUSTODIAN, GUARDIAN, OR CAREGIVER 
Aside from canons of statutory interpretation and legislative history, 
an overview of the differences between a “parent,” “legal custodian,” and 
general “caregiver” weigh in favor of saying that the legislature’s 
exclusion of the term “caregiver” in section 39.01(15)(e) was 
contemplative and purposeful. Repurposing “caregiver” to expand section 
(15)(e) is problematic because it would radically change the meaning of 
the provision. The “caregiver” umbrella encompasses many different 
categories that are unequal in legal weight. The legal distinctions would 
become muddied in a provision that is premised on these same 
distinctions. 
                                                                                                                  
52 Id. 
53Fla. S. Comm. on Child. & Fams. & Sen. Mitchell, SB 1666 (1999) Staff Analysis 2 
(Mar. 23, 1999), available at 
https://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/1999/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB1666.cf.pdf. 
54See Fla. S. Jour. 1199 (Reg. Sess. 1999). 
55Supra note 54. 
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Two practical classes of caregivers exist. One category consists of 
those who have legal custody of the child, such as parents and legal 
custodians. The second category is everyone else: those adults that have 
no legally conferred status or legally recognized relationship to a certain 
child. As a practical concern, a caregiver that falls under a category lower 
than that of a parent or legal custodian does not have the power to do things 
like sign, authorize, or request legal or medical documents for the child.56 
Only a parent or legal custodian can give consent to any medical 
treatment.57 Perhaps surprisingly, even once parental rights are terminated, 
the Department of Children and Families (DCF) is still supposed to keep 
a parent informed of medical decisions. 
For children that are without a parent or legal custodian (or if there 
is a parent or legal custodian, but they cannot be reached or refuse 
treatment), the statutorily designated next step is to obtain a court order 
giving consent to medical treatment.58 However, medical treatment might 
be needed outside of normal working hours such that a court-order cannot 
be quickly obtained. Alternatively, DCF has the authority to consent; 
however, the authority of DCF to consent to medical treatment is limited 
to the time reasonably necessary to obtain court authorization.59 These last 
two options are obviously fraught with timing concerns in a medical 
emergency but are the only apparent legal recourse for a child who is only 
being taken care of by someone who is not their legal guardian. 
Furthermore, a parent’s legal claim to their child is the strongest 
claim. The right to parent is recognized as a fundamental right.60 So, a 
parent who has had their child sheltered from them has the opportunity to 
get custody back through the course of a dependency proceeding by 
completing their court-determined services. 61   Legal custodians or 
                                                                                                                  
56§ 39.407 (concerning medical, psychiatric, and psychological examination and 
treatment of child, and physical, mental, or substance abuse examination of person with 
or requesting child custody in regard to children who are not committed to the 
Department of Children and Families). 
57FLA. STAT. § 39.201(1)(a) (2017). 
58 Id. 
59DCF can only consent to “ordinary” medical treatment; any kind of surgery is not 
considered an “ordinary” procedure so a court order must always be obtained for surgery. 
See § 743.0645; Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. G.M., 816 So.2d 830, 831-32 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2002). 
60Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 645, 648 (2014) (“The legal rights of parenting, often summarized as ‘care, 
custody, and control’ over one’s children, were described by Justice O’Connor in Troxel 
v. Granville as ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.’ “) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). 
61§ 39.621(8). Reunification with parent is the first preferred permanency goal. 
§ 39.621(2)(a). 
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permanent guardians are a step down: they have certain custody rights 
enumerated under statute, but if a child were removed from a legal 
custodian or permanent guardian, that custodian or guardian would not 
have the same rights as a parent in a dependency proceeding.62 
Parents and legal custodians are held to more concrete legal 
responsibilities. For example, the parent or legal custodian of a child 
remains financially responsible for the cost of medical treatment provided 
to the child, even if the parent or legal custodian did not consent to the 
medical treatment.63 By contrast, it is unclear what rights or affirmative 
duties other caregivers have–the only language used in the statute is 
“responsible for a child’s welfare.” 64  A school employee or day-care 
employee, one such statutorily enumerated caregiver, is responsible for the 
child’s welfare–but common sense dictates that it would only be for the 
duration the child is at school or day care. In addition, the legislature chose 
to explicitly list the affirmative duties of a legal custodian: the “duty to 
protect, nurture, guide, and discipline the child and to provide him or her 
with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, 
and psychological care.”65 There is no equivalent list of explicit duties or 
responsibilities for general caregivers. 
The significance of a legally recognized relationship supports the 
idea that a general caregiver cannot be equated with a parent or legal 
custodian. A child without any legally recognized ties is subject to the 
charity and kindness of those who have no enforceable obligation to care 
for the child. The legislature did not treat general caregivers with the same 
weight as a parent or legal custodian/guardian, and a review of the 
pertinent responsibilities and duties supports this reasoning. While the 
presence of an already capable parent or legal custodian/guardian would 
surely prevent adjudication under section (15)(e), this logic should not 
extend to caregivers that have not been given any legally recognized 
relationship with the child. 
                                                                                                                  
62See § 39.01(34). The term “custodian” encompasses “guardian,” because legal custody 
is a legal status created by a court which vests in a custodian of the person or guardian . . 
..” (emphasis added). Id. 
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IV. Interaction between SIJ status and Dependency 
Provision Interpretation 
 
A. WHAT IS SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS? 
The next section will discuss how Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) 
status interacts with the interpretation of (15)(e). The issues surrounded 
(15)(e) have largely arisen in cases dealing with immigrant juveniles filing 
private dependency petitions—as such, a discussion of SIJ status is 
appropriate and necessary. As the Third DCA expressed, “[t]hat [this 
immigrant juvenile’s] petition floats on an undercurrent of polarized views 
regarding national immigration policy is . . . without question.”66 
SIJ status was created in 1990 by the United States Congress through 
an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), to provide 
special consideration for undocumented juvenile immigrants who have 
suffered parental abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 67  The United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the agency charged with the ultimate power to grant 
SIJ status, has set out more exact requirements for its application. 
The Code of Federal Regulations sets out the rules promulgated by 
USCIS to apply for SIJ status.  An alien juvenile is eligible for 
classification as a special immigrant if he or she: 
(1) Is under twenty-one years of age;  
(2) Is unmarried;  
(3) Has been declared dependent upon a juvenile court located in 
the United States in accordance with state law governing such 
declarations of dependency, while the alien was in the United 
States and under the jurisdiction of the court;  
(4) Has been deemed eligible by the juvenile court for long-term 
foster care;  
(5) Continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and 
eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency 
or eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise 
ended; and  
(6) Has been the subject of judicial proceedings or administrative 
proceedings authorized or recognized by the juvenile court in 
                                                                                                                  
66In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749, 766 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), decision quashed sub 
nom. B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S472 (Fla. Apr. 
20, 2017). 
67WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN FLORIDA: 
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which it has been determined that it would not be in the alien’s 
best interest to be returned to the country of nationality or last 
habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parent or 
parents.68 
Subsection 6 refers to what is commonly referred to as a “special 
findings order” or “best interest order” from a state dependency court. This 
order (1) certifies that reunification with one or both parents is not viable 
due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis under state law, and 
(2) states that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned 
to the parent’s previous country of nationality or residence.69 The juvenile 
then petitions for SIJ status by filing the requisite forms with USCIS.70 
USCIS then engages in its investigation and makes the ultimate 
determination as to whether SIJ status will be granted.71 
While the federal regulation states that it requires “adjudication of 
dependency,”72 it does not reflect Congress’s changes to the SIJ status 
requirements. 73  The federal regulation does refer back to the original 
section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act74—Congress 
has since amended this act’s codified language.75 It is no longer strictly 
required that a juvenile be adjudicated dependent to apply for SIJ status—
a quasi-declaration of dependency will do.76 The juvenile can be: 
[D]eclared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States 
or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the 
custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity 
appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and 
whose reunification with [one] or both of the immigrant’s parents is not 
                                                                                                                  
688 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2018). The seventh provision only applies to aliens before June 1, 
1994. Id. 
69Id.; see Shannon Aimee Daugherty, Note, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: The Need 
To Expand Relief, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2015); Immigration and Nationality 
Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2014). 
70SIJ Petition Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/sij-petition-process (last 
updated Sept. 21, 2016). 
71Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) 
(2018); H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
728 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3). 
73William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(repassed and codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101). 
748 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (“An alien is eligible for classification as a special immigrant 
under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act . . . .”). 
75U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, MEMORANDUM ON TRAFFICKING VICTIMS 
PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT (TVPRA) OF 2008: SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE 
STATUS PROVISIONS (March 24, 2009) at 2 [hereinafter USCIS MEMO]. 
76 Id. 
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viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under 
State law [emphasis added].77 
The second provision allows a juvenile more flexibility in applying 
for SIJ status, in that it allows a change of placement, paternity action, or 
a similar court order deciding the child’s placement or custody to satisfy 
the eligibility requirement. While the most common practice in Florida is 
to file a petition for dependency, under the language above it is perfectly 
acceptable to use another type of petition or action. 78  The USCIS 
application forms reflect this updated language. 79  As Judge Salter 
accurately pointed out in In re T.J., a dependency adjudication is not 
required for SIJ status and this misperception can lead to unwanted 
outcomes: “T.J. should be eligible for placement with her aunt as a ‘fit and 
willing relative,’ section 39.6231 . . . The adjudication will permit T.J. to 
seek federal immigration status as a special immigrant juvenile . . . A 
summary denial, on the other hand, might incent T.J.’s aunt to truly 
‘abandon’ T.J. at a police station or Department office in a misguided 
effort to obtain a dependency ruling.”80 
In sum, in order to be considered eligible for SIJ status, the juvenile 
must either be declared dependent by a state juvenile court or have any 
state court render a decision as to the legal or physical custody of the 
juvenile. However, there is still confusion in the legal landscape—a 
common belief in the dependency system is that only a dependency 
adjudication can render a juvenile eligible to apply for SIJ status.81 This 
underutilization of other types of court orders, such as an order appointing 
guardianship, raises the bar for immigrant juveniles attempting to get SIJ 
                                                                                                                  
778 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018). 
78Florida can look to other state and federal cases affirming the feasibility of using other 
types of orders. In In re Menjivar, a federal immigration administrative appeals unit 
found that a child was eligible for SIJ status because a Texas state court had designated a 
family member to serve as the child’s guardian or conservator. See WENDI J. 
ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN FLORIDA: A GUIDE 
FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 9 (2007), 
http://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/children-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-
juvenile-manual-2007.pdf; see also B.F. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 730, 732 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that the action of a state probate court taking jurisdiction 
and rendering a decision as to the care and custody of the minors was sufficient to qualify 
the minors for SIJ status). 
79USCIS Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (“Have 
you been declared dependent upon a juvenile court in the United States, or have you 
been legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a 
State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court?”). 
80In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). 
81In Person Interview with Prof. Paolo Annino, Supervising Attorney, Children’s 
Advocacy Clinic, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 26, 2016). 
 
2018] One Child, Two Systems 43 
status and has likely contributed to the perception of SIJ hopefuls 
misappropriating Florida dependency channels. 82  Greater utilization of 
other types of petitions can be one creative solution to the dissimilitude 
among the Florida District Courts of Appeal. 
B. FEDERALISM AND APPLICATION ISSUES 
Like many conflicts in the law, this circuit split becomes clearer 
when looked at through a federalism lens. State law has been subsumed 
for a larger federal goal; in response, state courts are on alert for 
misappropriation of their state judicial system. Congress has made several 
amendments over the years, expanding the availability of SIJ status. The 
amendments removed the “eligible for long-term foster care” requirement, 
and the threshold for application was expanded in three directions: by 
adding that a court could find the juvenile’s “reunification ‘with one or 
both’ of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis under state law.”83 The definition of 
“Special Immigrant Juvenile” was also expanded to include a child “who 
has been placed under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by 
a State or juvenile court.”84  Several other changes are explained in a 
memorandum issued by USCIS.85 
Although the SIJ status determination belongs to the federal 
government, only state courts can make the needed dependency and best 
interest findings. Each dependency provision is a valid basis for 
dependency and therefore a valid basis for SIJ status.86 Using existing state 
dependency provisions presents complications, because state dependency 
statutes were not designed for this purpose. It is likely that state-
dependency provisions were envisioned with the “garden-variety” 
dependency case in mind. 
Cases dealing with immigrant children are intertwined with larger 
issues. For one, attempts to locate and communicate with parents or other 
witnesses outside the United States are fraught with logistical difficulties. 
Additionally, the facts surrounding an alien juvenile’s petition are 
naturally different than the typical case accounted for by the Florida 
                                                                                                                  
82O.I.C.L v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). 
83USCIS MEMO, supra note 79. In stark contrast with the recent Florida Supreme Court’s 
recent decision which dismissed a dependency petition for mootness, the 2008 
amendments attempted to protect immigrant juveniles from being denied SIJ status on the 
basis of mootness by pegging the case to the age of the child at the time of filing. Id. 
(citing section 235(d)(6) of the TVPRA). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
868 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). 
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Legislature in Chapter 39. State judges must contemplate how to approach 
child abuse cases that originate outside the United States. This problem 
applies to all of Florida’s seven dependency grounds. For example, 
imagine a fifteen-year old girl who lives safely and comfortably in the 
U.S., but whose parents firmly intend on forcing her into a marriage with 
a much older adult man when she is returned to her home country. If this 
case occurred in Florida alone, it would fit nicely under a section 
39.01(15)(f) argument (“substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, 
or neglect by the parents or legal custodians”).87 When relying on Florida 
law, courts have no clear guidance on whether to consider this an 
“immediate” threat of harm. She faces no harm in the United States. The 
danger is arguably speculative because it would not occur unless and when 
she is deported to her home country. The child faces what is essentially 
the “threat [of] deportation,” 88  which does not fit well under any 
dependency provision. The harm that will most assuredly occur at the 
hands of her parents depends on the federal government’s decision to 
deport—but a state judge cannot read the minds of immigration 
authorities, and so the risk of deportation is difficult to ascertain. If that 
harm is inflicted, it is then arguably inflicted at the will of the federal 
government. Some aspects of immigration are inadvertently being brought 
into the courtroom for state judges to grapple with.89 
Problems in applying state law to complex immigrant juvenile cases 
are undoubtedly what led to the sudden circuit split. In In re K.B.L.V., the 
court expresses its sentiments towards the marriage of state and federal in 
this area as such: “It is as if we are customs agents, although the federal 
government will make the final decision. I admit to an erosion of roles 
between state and federal responsibilities in our federal system in recent 
times. However, we are not yet colonies or territories of the United States 
government. We correctly decline to subordinate ourselves to the whim of 
the United States Congress in this case.” 90 
 
V. Conclusions 
A multitude of factors indicate that the judicial expansion of section 
39.01(15)(e), Florida Statutes, cannot be supported by the text or 
legislative purpose. I conclude that taking a straightforward approach and 
                                                                                                                  
87FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f) (2017). 
88In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). 
89As stated above, the federal government requires that a state court make a decision as 
to whether it is not in the child’s best interests to return to his or her country of origin. 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). 
90In re K.B.L.V., 176 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). 
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sticking with the literal language of section (15)(e) is the more reasonable 
interpretation. A textual overview, the available legislative history, and the 
legal differences between a general “caregiver,” a “legal custodian,” and 
a “parent” all militate strongly in favor of saying that the legislature 
intentionally left out “caregiver” in section (15)(e). Only the lack of a 
capable parent or legal custodian, i.e. someone that the child has a legally 
significant relationship, would be so meaningful that it would render a 
child dependent on the state. The most concerning aspect of the judicial 
expansion of (15)(e) is that it would compel petitioners to show more than 
what Florida’s statutory language requires. 
This judicial expansion has appeared prominently in opinions 
concerning privately filed juvenile petitions, with language expressing 
strong skepticism towards petitions filed on behalf of juveniles seeking SIJ 
status.91 It should be acknowledged that immigrant juveniles’ petitions are 
different. Fact-finding is naturally more difficult: there are greater barriers 
to confirm allegations that took place in another country. Additionally, 
Florida’s dependency system and its relevant statutes are not truly built to 
accommodate the involvement of private attorneys.92 The Department of 
Children and Families is normally responsible for bringing dependency 
petitions and thus has the ability and incentive to regulate the flow of 
dependency cases. The introduction of private petitions upsets that 
balance. Perhaps one solution would be for the legislature to better amend 
dependency law and resources to accommodate for private petitioners. The 
ultimate answer, however, is to recognize that there will be difficulties in 
fact-finding and not to punish juvenile petitioners with complex cases. 
Individual attorneys in the field play an important role. Private 
attorneys seeking dependency petitions for their clients should utilize 
other types of petitions to meet SIJ status eligibility. The federal statute 
does not strictly require that a juvenile be declared dependent, as discussed 
earlier.93 Private attorneys should make full use of temporary custody, 
paternity, appointment of guardianship, custody, and support, and DJJ 
(commitment to a Department of Juvenile Justice detention center) orders. 
Admittedly, this solution does more to circumvent the problem than 
address it head on; however, greater usage of other types of court orders 
would reduce both the perception and actual number of SIJ hopefuls 
                                                                                                                  
91See supra Section IV; O.I.C.L. 169 So. 3d at 1250 (“While this court is sympathetic to 
the plight of alien minors seeking the opportunity of a better life in the United States, the 
role of the trial judge is not to set immigration policy or to decide whether, as a 
humanitarian gesture, any particular alien minor should be permitted to stay in the United 
States.”). 
92See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1), § 39.5075(4)-(5) (2017) (stating it is DCF’s 
responsibility to file for SIJ status for a dependent child). 
938 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). 
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seeking dependency orders—thereby alleviating stress on state 
dependency system resources and avoiding the thorny legal issues that 
arise when state dependency law and immigration issues become 
intertwined. 
USCIS should make it clearer that attorneys truly can use these other 
types of court orders. Although other types of orders are mentioned on the 
application forms for SIJ, the agency has not amended its published 
regulations to reflect Congress’s amendments. 94 The current published 
Code of Federal Regulations is still in conflict with the U.S. Code and can 
be confusing for petitioners. It has likely misled many into believing a 
dependency adjudication is the only option for meeting SIJ eligibility. 
If the courts must consider the caregiver in their dependency 
determination, they can. The caregiver can be an indicator of the parent’s 
capability (or custodian’s capability), for better or worse. Courts can focus 
on the key issue of section (15)(e)—does the child have a “capable parent 
or legal custodian”—and still consider the child’s informal caregiver. For 
example, evidence can be presented as to whether the parent or legal 
custodian is the one who made appropriate arrangements with a caregiver, 
signed over power of attorney to the caregiver, is sending money to care 
for the child in their stead, or other factors that indicate the capability or 
lack of capability to parent.95 
Florida’s courts rightfully should be concerned with any potential 
abuse of judicial resources; however, the plain language of the statute is 
the interpretation best supported both by the text and known legislative 
intent, and keeps the legal distinctions between “parents,” “legal 
custodians,” and “caregivers” intact. The legal community must be 
tenacious in pursuing those solutions which achieve greater uniformity 
and reliability in the application of our laws, for all children in our state. 
 
                                                                                                                  
94See supra Section III. 
95Take, for example, a Tennessee case where the father worked as an over-the-road truck 
driver and had arranged for various caregivers for his child, most of whom he found at 
truck stops and restaurants; the father picked up the latest caregiver, who had outstanding 
warrants, in Atlanta, and after meeting her for one hour, moved her into his home and left 
the child with her for a period of three weeks. In re Ronald L.D., No. E2011-01619-
COA-R3-PT, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 49, *1, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 
